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make conscious decisions that strongly affect leverage. For example, Australian 
homeowners generally plan to pay off their mortgage before its contracted end 
date, and many are therefore ahead of schedule in paying off their housing debt. 
On the other hand, a minority of households have higher leverage than similar 
households because they have engaged in leveraged investment in both owner-
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ii HOUSING LEVERAGE IN AUSTRALIA 
Luci Ellis, Jeremy Lawson and Laura Roberts-Thomson 
1. Introduction 
Australia’s housing sector has long been characterised by relatively high 
homeownership rates and a predominance of variable-rate mortgages. Thus, it 
might be expected that fluctuations in housing prices would have a relatively 
strong effect on consumption, and that households would be quite sensitive to 
interest rates (McLennan, Muellbauer and Stephens 1999). When mortgage rates 
rise, it impinges on the cash flows of indebted households. This will tend to reduce 
their consumption, unless they are able to offset this cash-flow effect with further 
borrowing, or reductions in savings or excess repayments of principal. 
In this paper, we focus on a particular dimension of households’ balance sheets, the 
leverage on owner-occupied housing. Although households’ debt-income ratios 
determine the relative effect of a given-sized change in interest rates on their cash 
flows, we focus on leverage – the debt-assets ratio – because this might help 
determine the level of debt that households are willing to bear, in addition to the 
burden of repayments. 
Leverage might be expected to influence households’ and intermediaries’ 
behaviour through a number of channels. Data from the UK suggests that some 
households will try to reduce their leverage in response to a negative wealth shock 
such as a fall in housing prices (Smith, Sterne and Devereux 1994). Households’ 
desired leverage might itself be endogenously affected by the business cycle or 
uncertainty if choices about balance sheets reflect precautionary savings motives 
(Carroll and Dunn 1997). 
Leverage is also important because of its likely implications for credit supply. 
Increases in interest rates might not induce households to reduce consumption if 
they can borrow additional funds, but intermediaries’ willingness to lend more to 
households might be reduced if leverage is particularly high. Households with 
higher leverage might therefore be less likely to offset fluctuations in their cash 2 
flow with further borrowing. Their ability to smooth their consumption during 
downturns might thus be constrained by asset-price developments associated with 
that downturn (Bernanke and Gertler 1995; Carroll and Dunn 1997). In addition, 
since real estate is widely used as collateral for loans, the level of leverage is a 
determinant of the balance-sheet risk of financial institutions (Kent and 
Lowe 1997; Schwartz 2002). 
Finally, the interaction of leverage with movements in house prices will determine 
the prevalence of negative equity, which in turn has implications for labour market 
flexibility (Henley 1999) and the behaviour of the real estate market (Genesove 
and Mayer 1997). Although we do not cover these issues in this cross-sectional 
study, an understanding of housing leverage may help explain housing market 
features such as pricing inertia and the correlation between falling prices and a 
larger stock of unsold homes. 
Despite the range of reasons why households’ leverage might be important, most 
previous literature either focuses on the narrower decision on housing tenure 
(Bourassa 1994, 1995), or uses broader wealth data as yet unavailable for Australia 
to examine household portfolio behaviour more generally (e.g., the papers in 
Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2002)). In this paper, we focus on cross-sectional, 
microeconomic aspects of households’ housing leverage, with a view to 
understanding which households are most likely to be affected by changes in 
interest rates or falls in housing prices. In Section 2, we discuss the HILDA dataset 
and our approach to imputing missing income data; the econometric results 
underlying our imputation methods are presented in Appendix  A. After 
undertaking some preliminary graphical analysis in Section 3, we set up our core 
econometric model in Section 4 and discuss its implications. A brief conclusion 
follows in Section 5. 
2.  The HILDA Dataset 
In this study we use data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey. HILDA is a household-based panel or longitudinal 
survey that aims to track all members of an initial sample of Australian households 
over time. The survey was commissioned by the Department of Family and 
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Community Services and is directed by the Melbourne Institute. This study uses 
data from the first wave of the survey, collated from interviews conducted with 
some 14 000 individuals living in almost 7 700 households over the second half of 
2001. The survey contains a wealth of possible explanatory variables, covering 
four broad areas: economic wellbeing, labour market dynamics, family dynamics, 
and subjective wellbeing. 
2.1  Constructing the Housing Leverage Variable 
Housing leverage is typically expressed as a loan-to-valuation (LTV) ratio, in 
contrast to the debt-equity ratios commonly used in analysis of corporate finance. 
We can construct LTV ratios for homeowners’ principal residence using 
information from the household questionnaire in Wave 1 of HILDA. Homeowners 
were asked to estimate the current value of their home, and to report the amount 
they currently owed on loans taken out against that home, including institutional 
mortgages, loans from family, friends and other members of the community, and 
home equity loans. To calculate the LTV ratio, we total the outstanding amounts of 
all borrowings against the principal residence and divide it by the estimate of the 
home’s value. Households who rented, or who occupied their home rent-free but 
did not own it, were not asked these questions. Information on other properties 
such as investment properties or holiday homes was not included, so our study 
relates specifically to owner-occupiers’ principal residences. 
The use of subjective valuations raises the question of their accuracy. Goodman 
and Ittner (1993), using US survey data, find that there is a small positive bias of 
about 6 per cent in homeowners’ estimates, but that the mean absolute error of 
estimates tends to be larger at about 15 per cent. This may be due to rounding 
errors: 42 per cent of households reporting estimated home values in HILDA 
reported a figure that was a multiple of $50  000. We believe our analysis is 
unlikely to be significantly biased by homeowners’ subjectivity. If the bias in their 
estimates is small and, as Goodman and Ittner find, unrelated to owners’ 
characteristics, then our point estimates will not be significantly biased even if 
these rounding errors make them less precise. In any case, households’ behaviour 
presumably depends on their perceptions of their leverage rather than realised 
leverage, especially if they are not intending to sell their homes in the near future. 
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2.2  Missing Data and Income Imputation1 
Compared with similar international household surveys, HILDA does not suffer 
greatly from problems of missing data (Watson and Wooden 2003). For example, 
only 4 per cent of households with mortgages fail to report the value of their loans, 
while the value of the principal residence is missing for only 6 per cent of owning 
households; these households are excluded from the results below. However, there 
is a relatively high incidence of missing data for income-related questions. We can 
separate the most common reasons for non-response into ‘item non-response’ and 
‘incomplete households’. Item non-response occurs when a member of a selected 
household agrees to be interviewed, but then either refuses, or is unable, to answer 
some of the questions asked. This is the main source of missing data, accounting 
for 64 per cent of the missing household income information. Most of the missing 
income data is due to item non-response for income sourced from business 
(missing 23.5 per cent of people with business income) and investments (missing 
8.1 per cent of recipients of this kind of income). Wages and salaries (missing 
7.2  per cent of wage earners) and government benefits and pensions (missing 
1.4 per cent of benefit recipients) have lower incidences of missing data. 
The other major source of missing data is the 810 incomplete households, 
accounting for 10.5 per cent of the household sample and 36 per cent of the 
missing household income information; these are households in which not all 
eligible adult members agreed, or were able, to be interviewed. The HILDA dataset 
as distributed does not include an entry for household income if any of its eligible 
members were not interviewed, or did not report complete income information; in 
all, 29 per cent of households have a missing value for household income, which is 
clearly an unacceptable data loss. 
In such circumstances we have two choices. We can drop the 29 per cent of 
households for which income data is missing from the sample, or impute the 
income of the individuals with missing data. Our choice to impute income for 
missing individuals is shaped by two factors. First, because income non-response 
is not random or uncorrelated with the variable(s) of interest, the missing cases 
cannot be safely dropped from the sample (Watson and Wooden 2003). For 
example, men, individuals outside the labour force, and people with large amounts 
                                           
1  This section and Appendix A report work by Gianni La Cava and Jeremy Lawson. 
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of leisure time (and generally have low incomes) were more likely to offer 
complete income information than other individuals. Second, we have a large 
cross-section of information from the HILDA Survey that presumably permits us 
to do a reasonable job of imputing income where the information is missing. 
2.2.1 Imputation  methodology 
Following the recommendations of the HILDA Survey team and methods adopted 
in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), we impute income using the 
predictive mean matching method (Little 1988; ISER 2002; Watson and 
Wooden 2003). This is a stochastic imputation technique that has the advantage of 
maintaining the underlying distribution of the data by allowing the imputation of 
error around the mean. Appendix A outlines the method in detail and shows the 
regression results for the three models. 
The nature of the missing data leaves us with the need to impute income for three 
separate types of missing cases: 
1. Individuals that did not complete a person questionnaire and therefore did 
not report any income information (Type I) (n = 1 158). 
2. Individuals that completed a person questionnaire but did not provide 
information on wage income (Type II) (n = 673). 
3. Individuals that completed a person questionnaire but did not provide 
information on non-wage income (Type III) (n = 1 621). 
Three separate models are estimated to impute income for each type of missing 
case. For Type I respondents we have information on the characteristics of their 
household (e.g., value of the dwelling, geographic location, the number of 
bedrooms) and a limited range of personal information from the household 
questionnaire. We also have personal information collected about other 
respondents in the household. These ‘family variables’ include the income, labour 
force status and occupation of other household members. Both the household and 
family variables are likely to be correlated with both personal and household 
income and hence act as useful explanatory variables in the model. We impute 
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total gross financial year income for these individuals. For Types II and III 
respondents we also have additional personal information obtained from items that 
they did complete – labour force status, age, gender, English-speaking background 
– including information about the sources of their income. This allows us to predict 
wage and non-wage income, and add to it the income that individuals report from 
other sources. For example, for Type III individuals we add their imputed non-
wage income to any actual reported wage and salary income. 
2.2.2 Imputation  results 
In the regression model for Type I households our model explains nearly 
32 per cent of the variation in total gross household income. The root mean square 
error (RMSE) is about $26 000. In the regression model for Type II households our 
model explains about 46 per cent of the variation in individuals’ wage and salary 
income and the RMSE is nearly $19 000. In the regression model for Type III 
households our model explains nearly 21 per cent of the variation in individuals’ 
non-wage income and the RMSE is about $20 500. Although these errors are quite 
large, we regard the imputation as being relatively successful, not least because it 
allows us to use reported income from other income sources and household 
members that would otherwise be lost. 
Our income imputation strategy allowed us to recover household income estimates 
for all but 201 households (about 3 per cent of the sample), ensuring that any bias 
introduced by dropping missing observations from the sample is minimised. 
However, because our imputed household income estimates are likely to diverge 
from the true income that households did not report, we also construct a dummy 
variable for those households with imputed household income. This dummy was 
not significant in any of our three equations, implying that inclusion of households 
with imputed income did not significantly distort our results. 
2.3  User Cost of Housing 
The model outlined in Section 4 includes a model of households’ tenure decisions. 
These depend on the utility they gain from owning rather than renting, and the 
relative costs of each tenure type. The relative cost of owning compared to renting 
is calculated by multiplying housing i’s user cost of housing, uim, by the price-rent 
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ratio in the relevant geographical area m. User cost captures the net per-unit cost of 
owning for owner-occupiers. We calculated it similarly to Bourassa (1995) as 
Equation (1), so as to take account of the details of Australia’s tax system – 
specifically, that mortgage interest payments are not deductible. 
             m i i im im r v r v t u 1 1  (1) 
As is standard in the literature, per-unit user costs include the rate of depreciation 
, and the interest repayments on any mortgage, which in turn depend on interest 
rates r. Because interest payments are not deductible, this cost also depends on the 
mean expected leverage for household i’s age group, vi. As in Bourassa (1995), this 
depends on the household’s age and its permanent income, as estimated using its 
observable characteristics. The use of a group mean, not actual leverage, minimises 
any endogeneity concerns. There are also tax benefits to owner-occupation because 
the flow of housing services (imputed rent) is not taxed but actual rent is paid from 
post-tax income. Therefore there are tax and income costs to moving from owning 
to renting, as shown in the first term in Equation (1).2 Owner-occupiers also accrue 
the benefit of expected capital gains on their home, m, which are calculated here 
using past housing price inflation in market m. Bourassa (1994, 1995) contains 
more detail on the calculation of the components. 
3. Preliminary  Analysis 
Before we outline an estimated model of household housing leverage in Section 4, 
we first present some stylised facts about housing leverage in Australia, identify 
some of the household characteristics likely to influence households’ housing 
leverage, and undertake a brief graphical analysis of how three key variables – age 
of the household head, household income, and household housing wealth – are 
related to leverage. 
                                           
2  The income cost per unit of housing from moving from owning to renting is (1-vi)r. tim is the 
ratio of the change in tax payable to the change in income in moving from owning to renting, 
where the difference between the payable taxes in the tenure states are calculated using the 
household’s permanent income. Thus, (1-tim)(1-vi)r is the per unit income and tax cost of 
moving from owning to renting. 
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According to the HILDA Survey the homeownership rate in 2001 was 68 per cent, 
broadly consistent with both the 2001 Census and the 1998 Household Expenditure 
Survey (HES). Of these owner-occupying households, 42 per cent were still paying 
off their home and a further 9 per cent had other kinds of debt secured against it, 
such as a second mortgage or home equity loan. Households with some leverage 
therefore represented around one-third of the households surveyed. The average 
level of household leverage implied by the HILDA data is a little below the level 
implied by the aggregate credit data, at around 15 per cent for all owner-occupying 
households. This is despite the inclusion of loans from friends and family that are 
not in the aggregate data; these account for just under half of a percentage point of 
the average. The leverage of only those households with outstanding debt on their 
owner-occupied home averages around 48 per cent, which given the definitional 
differences in the debt measure, is roughly consistent with aggregate figures. 
Although these figures confirm that, on average, housing debt is much lower than 
the value of housing assets, we are also interested in how this leverage is 
distributed across Australian households. Figure 1 shows that the distribution of 
leverage is fairly evenly spread, but few Australian households have high leverage, 
that is, an LTV ratio greater than 80 per cent.3 Only 11.4 per cent of households 
with housing loans (less than 4 per cent of all households) had an LTV ratio that 
exceeded 80 per cent, and less than 3 per cent had negative equity in their homes.4 
                                           
3  Our use of an 80 per cent threshold is consistent with evidence in Genesove and Mayer (1997) 
that household behaviour alters when leverage exceeds this level, and it allows us to consider 
how the incidence of negative equity might change if house prices were to fall by a significant 
amount. It is also the threshold above which borrowers require mortgage insurance. 
4  There may be other households with high leverage against other properties not captured here, 
such as an investment property. Unfortunately this possibility cannot be explored until 
Wave 2 HILDA data, including information on wealth, are released in late 2003. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Loan-to-valuation Ratios 
Percentage of households with housing loans 










3.1  Leverage and Household Characteristics 
We can use the wealth of cross-sectional information about Australian households 
contained in the HILDA dataset to investigate whether the diversity of household 
leverage is related to observable characteristics. 
There are a number of household characteristics that can be expected to influence 
housing leverage. First, we would expect leverage to be affected by a household’s 
stage in the life cycle. Leverage should be low for young households because their 
homeownership rates are low; few younger households would have saved enough 
to purchase a home while they are still completing their education and establishing 
their careers. Indeed, younger people may not have formed households at all for 
these reasons. Leverage should then rise as households move into their peak family 
formation years. This usually occurs early in their working lives when they have 
accumulated little wealth, so they must borrow to purchase large assets such as the 
family home. This debt is then steadily reduced over their working lives so that 
they are relatively debt-free when their incomes drop sharply upon retirement. 
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Variables that capture a household’s position in the life cycle, such as the 
household head’s age, labour force status, and marital status should therefore be 
important in explaining housing leverage. We also expect that the time since the 
mortgage was taken out, which we proxy using time the household has lived in the 
home, will be an important determinant of household leverage. 
A household’s means, and in particular its income, should also affect its leverage 
by influencing its willingness, need and ability to take on housing debt. We expect 
leverage to increase with income for three main reasons. First, higher-income 
households are more likely to be homeowners in the first place, because they are 
more likely to have been able to save the necessary downpayment. Second, we 
expect households that have paid off their mortgages to have lower incomes than 
households with existing mortgages, because retired lower-income households 
prefer to have paid off their debt. Finally, housing leverage may be expected to 
increase with income if financial institutions apply easier lending criteria to high-
income households. The expected importance of household means in predicting 
leverage also leads us to anticipate that alternative indicators of household means, 
such as self-assessed income adequacy and the past occurrence of family 
breakdown should also influence leverage. Offsetting this, high-income households 
have more scope to pay off their loan quickly and thus own their home outright. 
Finally, we would expect households’ attitude to homeownership and debt to 
influence their housing leverage. For example, households that are uncomfortable 
about taking on debt may accumulate more savings before purchasing a home than 
households that feel more comfortable taking on debt. They may also choose to 
pay their loans off faster. Other variables that may pick up different attitudes to 
homeownership or debt across households include households’ ethnic background, 
aversion to risk, and credit card usage. 
3.2 Graphical  Analysis 
In Section 3.1 we identified a number of household characteristics that can be 
expected to influence a household’s housing leverage. Before using this 
information in an econometric model, it is worth examining graphically how three 
key variables – age of the household head, household income, and household 
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housing wealth – are related to housing leverage, treating households without 
mortgages as having zero leverage.  
3.2.1  Age of the household head 
Figure 2 shows how housing leverage varies across age cohorts. In addition to 
mean leverage for each cohort we also include information about the distribution 
of leverage – the interquartile range, and the percentage of households with an 
LTV ratio greater than 80 per cent. The right-hand panel contains data only for 
households with mortgages, while the left-hand panel includes all households. 





































































Age of household head
Households with mortgages % All households %
■ Mean
  Interquartile range
–– % of HH with LTV ratio >80%
 
Looking first to the right panel, younger households with mortgages appear to have 
higher leverage than their older counterparts. Average leverage was almost 
70 per cent for households where the household head was aged between 25 and 29, 
compared with 40 per cent for households with a head aged between 45 and 49. 
Similarly, younger households are more likely to have high leverage. Just under 
one-quarter of leveraged owner-occupying households with heads aged between 
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25 and 29 had leverage exceeding 80 per cent, a number that falls to just under 
8 per cent for households with heads aged between 45 and 49. Because there is 
some association between age of the household head and time spent in 
homeownership, it is difficult to distinguish whether this is a pure age effect, or a 
reflection of the time the household has had to pay off their initial loan. This issue 
will be investigated in our econometric analysis in the following sections. 
The left panel of Figure  2 shows that when younger households’ lower 
homeownership rate is taken into account, their apparent higher leverage is 
reduced, and the nature of the relationship between age and leverage changes. 
Average leverage now increases to a peak when the household head is aged 30 to 
34 before falling away as households pay off their housing debt. This observation 
is important because it shows that if we use a sample that only includes households 
with mortgages, we may exaggerate the incidence of leverage for categories of 
households with low homeownership rates, or higher rates of outright ownership 
where the mortgage has already been paid off. In our graphical analysis we make 
use of both samples so that we can observe pockets of high leverage in categories 
that otherwise have low debt. Similarly, in our empirical analysis, we use a 
technique that enables us to capture both the marginal effect of variables on 
leverage for those who have debt and the effect of these variables on the 
probability of having debt, giving us the total effect of variables on leverage. 
3.2.2 Household  income 
Figure 3 suggests that there may be a hump-shaped relationship between household 
income and leverage. Average leverage is greatest among upper-middle income 
households, and falls away somewhat for both low-income and high-income 
households. When the lower homeownership rate and share of households with 
existing loans in the bottom two income quintiles is taken into account (left panel), 
their average leverage looks particularly low. This may be partly an age effect; the 
average age of household heads in quintiles 1 and 2 is higher (at 55) than in the 
three higher income quintiles (at about 42). 
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Figure 3: Housing Leverage by Income Quintile 












Households with mortgages %% All households
■ Mean
 Interquartile range
–– % of HH with LTV ratio >80%
 
3.2.3 Housing  wealth 
Although the Wave 1 HILDA Survey did not ask households about their 
non-housing wealth, their estimates of the current market value of their homes 
should capture a large proportion of their assets. According to Figure 4 there is a 
strong negative relationship between households’ housing leverage and the value 
of their properties. Households with properties worth less than $100 000 had an 
average leverage (at almost 60 per cent) roughly double that of households with 
properties worth in excess of $500 000. The low average incidence of leverage 
among households with expensive properties is reflected in the much lower 
likelihood of their being leveraged above 80 per cent, at 3 per cent compared to 
over 20 per cent for households with homes worth less then $100 000. However, 
because owner-occupying households that have paid off their mortgages were 
more likely to have homes worth less than $100 000, their average leverage falls to 
about the same amount as households with homes worth between $100 000 and 
$199 000 when this is taken into account (left panel). 
There are a couple of possible explanations for the negative relationship between 
housing wealth and housing leverage. First, if a household’s housing wealth is 
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positively correlated with its age and tenure length, then the observed relationship 
may only suggest that younger households, which are more likely to be highly 
leveraged, are also more likely to own cheaper homes. Second, if more expensive 
homes have appreciated more rapidly than less expensive homes, households that 
own more expensive homes will have experienced a larger passive reduction in 
their leverage, for a given length of tenure. Shocks to the price of a particular home 
have the opposite effect on the leverage ratio. If households update their 
assessments of their homes’ current value for past price changes without adjusting 
their housing debt, this could generate a negative relationship between current 
estimated housing wealth and leverage. 
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–– % of HH with LTV ratio >80%
 
One possible implication of the negative relationship between leverage and 
housing wealth is that leverage might be lower in locations with the highest 
housing prices, holding everything else constant. It is these areas – New South 
Wales and Victoria, and the inner suburbs of state capitals – that have experienced 
the strongest rises in housing prices recently, and thus where passive reductions in 
leverage are likely to have been greatest. In general, the data support this 
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argument. Average leverage is relatively low in New South Wales and Victoria, 
and particularly in their inner-city suburbs, as is the incidence of high leverage. For 
example, in the late 2001 fieldwork period of this survey, average leverage for 
households with leverage in inner Melbourne was around 35 per cent (38 per cent 
in inner Sydney), compared to over 50 per cent in inner Brisbane and Adelaide. 
Indeed, only 1 per cent of households living in inner Melbourne in late 2001 had 
an LTV ratio above 80 per cent.5 Provided the average length of tenure (i.e., the 
frequency of households’ decisions to trade up) is not greatly affected by the rate 
of house price inflation, this provides some comfort that those areas where 
concerns about future reversals of past price increases might be greatest are those 
where the negative equity consequences are least. This strengthens our general 
conclusion that the moderate level of aggregate housing leverage in Australia does 
not seem to be masking important pockets of potential vulnerability. 
4.  Econometric Model and Results 
4.1 Model  and  Methodology 
The only households with positive leverage are those that currently have debt 
against their home. By definition, leverage cannot be negative, so its distribution is 
censored at zero. The full sample of households also contains a large fraction of 
renters and outright homeowners who have no owner-occupied leverage. Although 
tobit techniques can be used to estimate some censored samples, they are 
inappropriate in the current context. Tobit models require that the explanators of 
whether the household has any leverage at all are the same as the determinants of 
its level. However, characteristics of the loan can be (and here turn out to be) 
important determinants of the level of leverage, but they are undefined for 
households without housing debt. Therefore they cannot also be used to explain 
whether or not a household has any leverage. 
On the other hand, estimating a model of leverage only over the sub-sample with 
debt does not allow assessment of the whole population’s behaviour. 
                                           
5  Classifying postcodes into inner and outer city groups requires some subjective judgment. We 
defined suburbs as inner city if they were fairly close to the CBD and considered prestige or 
fashionable places to live; the specific allocation of postcodes is available from the authors. 
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Gronau  (1974) and Lewis  (1974) showed that a censored sample may have 
unrepresentative characteristics relative to the whole population. Since this can 
bias OLS parameter estimates (Heckman 1976, 1979), we therefore model leverage 
using an appropriately specified selection model, which corrects for this bias. 
Table 1 illustrates that the leveraged sub-sample of the dataset used here could be 
unrepresentative. Households with housing debt have quite different age and 
income characteristics than the whole sample. The probability of having a 
mortgage is greatest for those aged 35–39, irrespective of household income. As 
income increases, so does the probability of having a mortgage. These two features 
imply that the sub-sample of households with a mortgage is likely to have a higher 
median income than the general population, and an over-representation of middle-
aged household heads. 
Table 1: Effect of Age and Income on Having a Mortgage 
Per cent of people in each category with a mortgage 
Age group  Income quintile 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
20–24  9.2  9.9 17.6 29.8 39.3 
25–29  12.3 14.2 35.0 44.5 43.9 
30–34  21.6 32.5 45.0 57.1 65.5 
35–39  28.4 36.7 49.8 66.7 68.4 
40–44  20.3 36.5 46.0 63.0 63.6 
45–49  12.1 27.5 39.6 50.0 58.1 
50–54  23.1 27.8 35.2 41.1 46.0 
55+  3.7  4.5 12.7 21.6 23.2 
 
Heckman (1976) proposed a two-step procedure to correct for selection bias, 
involving modelling of the rules that determine inclusion into the sample. The 
results from these selection models are then used to adjust the estimates for the 
equation of interest so that they capture population responses rather than those of 
the sub-sample over which they are estimated.6 Households with owner-occupied 
                                           
6 In an uncorrected model, the marginal effects only apply to those that actually have 
mortgages, while the bias-corrected (or population) marginal effects apply to all households if 
they were to have mortgages. The derived ‘population’ marginal effects are thus still 
conditional on the household having a mortgage. 
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leverage select themselves into this group by both owning their home and having 
some debt secured against it. Thus our model involves two selection rules: the 
tenure decision on whether or not the household owns rather than rents their home; 
and the mortgage decision on whether or not the household has housing debt. 
The error structure of the model depends crucially on whether the two decisions 
are made sequentially or jointly. The distinction between sequential and joint 
decisions relates to the interdependency of the two decisions, rather than their 
timing, as illustrated in Figure 5. If the two decisions are defined over the entire set 
of observations, so that all four cells are logically possible, then they are made 
jointly, regardless of whether all the outcomes represented by the cells are actually 
observed (Lee and Maddala 1985; Tunali 1986). The standard case of choices 
about education and labour supply is an example of a joint decision process 
(Fishe, Trost and Lurie 1981); an individual could choose to enter the labour force 
or not regardless of whether they had previously completed a particular level of 
education. Sequential decisions, on the other hand, are characterised by one 
decision only being defined given a particular outcome of the other decision 
(Maddala 1986). This is the case with our sample selection rules; a household 
cannot ‘decide’ to have a mortgage on an owner-occupied property if they are not 
owner-occupiers; cell 3 is infeasible. 
Figure 5: Selection Rule Matrix 
   Selection 
equation 2 
































Given this structure for the selection rules, we have a system in which the tenure 
selection equation is used to adjust the mortgage selection equation, which is only 
defined if the household is a homeowner (T ). These selection equations are 
estimated using maximum-likelihood probit techniques. As in all probit models, 
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The results from the selection equations can then be used to adjust the equation 
explaining leverage (levi), as shown in Equation (2), so that OLS estimates of  are 
consistent, although they are inefficient compared to maximum likelihood 
techniques. The second-stage OLS estimates of the error variance and covariance 
matrices are biased, but we make an approximate correction for this using the delta 
method (Heckman  1979; Tunali 1986). The parameter estimates are also quite 
sensitive to violations of the underlying normality assumptions; our preferred 
specifications preserve normality, but possibly at the cost of some efficiency. 









The additional variables 1 and 2 in the leverage equation capture the effect of 
selection on the error term: 
  . Because this is a 
double-selection model, they are not identical to the inverse Mills ratio in a 
standard Heckman-Lee single-selection model. 
Precise estimation of parameters depends on the three equations being sufficiently 
identified, which requires that the sets of explanators Z1, Z2 and X have at least 
some non-overlapping variables, so that the regressors for one equation are not 
simply capturing the same information as the selection terms (i). Our preferred 
specification involves several variables, such as user cost of housing, that are 
specific to one of the selection equations. It is nonetheless difficult to be certain 
that robust identification has been achieved; the significance of the selection terms 
in the leverage equation was sensitive to the inclusion in the selection equations of 
some statistically insignificant variables. The need to ensure identification and 
avoid multicollinearity result in a tendency to favour parsimonious specifications 
for our model, relative to the richness of the HILDA dataset. 
The residual in the tenure equation, e1i, is assumed to be distributed as a standard 
normal; e2i is also standard normal, but defined only on the subpopulation T ;  0 

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and vi is normally distributed on the subpopulation T ,   with variance 
 (Lee and Maddala 1985). The three errors may be correlated; the technique 
used here allows for this. Many of the unobserved factors explaining past mortgage 
repayments, and thus whether a mortgage has now been paid off, will be unrelated 









e2i could be correlated. At least some households’ decisions to rent are driven by 
their inability to obtain housing finance. Financial institutions’ willingness to lend 
might depend on variables that are not observed in the HILDA dataset such as 
savings history, past loan defaults and so on. Their influence would therefore end 
up in the residuals of both selection equations. 
4.2 Estimation  Results 
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates and Table 3 the prediction outcomes for the 
two selection equations. The fit and prediction rates are reasonable, and within 
only a few percentage points of results in previous studies of tenure choice in 
Australia (Bourassa 1994, 1995), despite the absence of information about 
important components of households’ wealth portfolios in HILDA. As expected, 
age, income and other indicators of life-cycle such as marital status are important 
determinants of homeownership. Age, income and other financial indicators were 
also strong determinants of whether home-owning households had housing debt. 
The indicator variables of whether anyone in the household made a profit or loss in 
the form of rental income are highly significant in the mortgage equation. 
Households that made a profit on their rental properties were significantly less 
likely to have a mortgage on their owner-occupied property than households 
without such income. In contrast, households that made a rental loss – that is, their 
expenses, including interest, on any mortgages against the investment property 
exceeded rental income – were significantly more likely to also have a mortgage 
on their home. 
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Table 2: Household Tenure and Mortgage Decision Regression Results 
 Tenure  Mortgage   Tenure  Mortgage 
Personal characteristics of the household head and demographic variables  
Age 1.4***  –2.6***  Married  30.4***   
Retired    –41.2***  Born in UK  –10.5   
Born in Europe
(a)  –22.3    Father born in UK  –2.3  10.2 
Father born in 
Europe
(a) 
27.2**  Student  –8.5   
Group household  –71.1***    Children at home    7.5*** 
Only speaks English at 
home 
 25.5***  Receives  youth 
allowance 
 –118.0*** 
Household means variables  
Income ($’000) 1.6***  0.5***  Income  squared  ($’000) –0.8*** –1.0*** 
Income cubed  1.5**    Interest income    –7.5*** 
Casual job    –18.9**  Income adequacy    –10.8*** 
Made profit on rental 
property 
  –22.1**  Made loss on rental 
property 
 30.5*** 
Financial and housing variables 




(b)  –26.0***    Importance of home
(b)  7.5***  
Moves in last 10 years    11.0***  Not moved recently    2.2 
Housing adequacy
(b)  13.0***    Value of home    0.02* 
Small apartment block  –58.3***    Tall apartment block  –91.0***   
Semi-detached 
dwelling 




Has credit card    –35.6***  No of bedrooms  21.3***   
Took out institutional 
loan 




Inner Sydney    24.5*  Non-metro NSW    22.7** 
Outer Melbourne    29.8**  Non-metro VIC    38.5***
Outer Brisbane    45.9***  Non-metro QLD    46.1***
Outer Adelaide    35.0***  Inner Perth    53.9* 
Outer Perth    46.7***  Non-metro WA    58.9***
Log-likelihood  –4 064.955   Correct prediction rate 85.6%  85.8% 
Notes:  ***, **, and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
  (a) Europe refers to Italy, Greece, Netherlands or Germany. 
  (b) Denotes ordered categorical variables. 
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Table 3: Prediction Rates for Selection Equations 
Tenure equation 
   Actual 
   Own  Rent  Total 
Predicted  Own  4 662  641  5 303 
  Rent  404  1 543  1 947 
  Total  5 066  2 184  7 250 
Mortgage equation 
   Actual 
   Mortgage  No  mortgage  Total 
Predicted  Mortgage  2 197  463  2 660 
  No mortgage  258  2 148  2 406 
  Total  2 455  2 611  5 066 
Prediction rate for tenure equation = 85.6% 
Prediction rate for mortgage equation = 85.8% 
 
The central results from the estimation of the equation for household housing 
leverage are contained in Table  4. Overall the results are reasonable, with our 
model explaining about 30 per cent of the variation in households’ housing 
leverage and an F-test of the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to 
zero rejected at all conventional levels of significance. The estimated parameters 
from the model correspond to the total effect of a one-unit change in that variable 
on leverage, expressed in percentage points of leverage. For variables that are also 
in the selection equations, this total effect includes the variable’s effect on leverage 
through its effect on the probability that the household has leverage at all. Table 4 
therefore also shows the marginal effects of these variables on leverage, 
conditional on the household having leverage, which can be calculated from the 
estimated coefficients on the selection terms using standard methods. For ease of 
interpretation, we split explanators in the equations into three categories of 
household characteristics – the stage of the household in the life cycle, household 
means, and characteristics relating to finance and housing – and a group of location 
dummies to control for region-specific effects and the effect of unexpected changes 
in housing prices on leverage. Other demographic variables that might be expected 
to be associated with leverage, such as the education level, occupation or gender of 
the household head, were insignificant and thus excluded from the final 
specification. 
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Table 4: Household Housing Leverage Regression Results 
 Total  Marginal   Total  Marginal 
Personal characteristics of household head and demographic variables  
Age   –0.6***  –0.5  Retired  –11.8**  –10.5* 
Married 3.3  3.2  Divorced  –1.5  –1.5 
De facto  3.8  3.9  Separated  11.0***  11.0*** 
Born in UK  –5.0*  –5.0*  Born in Europe
(a)  1.9 1.9 
Father born in UK  4.9**  4.6*  Father born in Europe
(a)  –6.8*** –6.9** 
Student 7.2  7.3       
Household means variables 
Income ($’000)  0.07
(c)  0.04 Income  squared  ($’000) –0.2  –0.1 
Income adequacy
(b) –1.1  –0.7  Satisfaction  with  pay
(b) 0.8***  0.8*** 
Casual job  –7.1***  –6.5***  Fixed-term contract  –2.8  –2.8 
Likelihood of losing job 
in next 12 months
(b) 
–0.03 –0.03  Had difficulty paying 
mortgage on time 
4.7** 4.7** 
Has rental income  14.2***  14.2***  Has imputed income  1.0  1.3 
Financial and housing variables 
Time lived at address  –0.8***  –0.7**  Planned pay off date  1.0***  1.0*** 
Ahead of mortgage 
repayment schedule 




Long saving horizon  4.0***  4.0***  Took out institutional 
loan to buy house 
18.2* 12.6 
Attitude to borrowing  1.1  1.1  Attitude to risk
(b) –0.8  –0.8 
Moves in last 10 years  1.2  0.8  No recent moves  –5.3***  –5.3*** 
Condition of home
(b)  3.0***  3.1***  Not a first-home buyer  6.2***  6.2*** 





Inner Sydney  5.4  4.5  Outer Sydney  13.9***  13.4*** 
Non-metro NSW  15.0***  14.2***  Outer Melbourne  14.7***  13.7*** 
Non-metro VIC  18.1***  16.8***  Inner Brisbane  22.1***  22.1*** 
Outer Brisbane  23.9***  22.4***  Non-metro QLD  23.2***  21.6*** 
Inner Adelaide  18.2***  18.2***  Outer Adelaide  21.0***  19.8*** 
Non-metro SA  28.5***  27.6***  Inner Perth  9.5  7.7 
Outer Perth  21.0***  19.4***  Non-metro WA  19.2***  17.2*** 
Inner Hobart  2.8  2.8  Outer-city TAS  22.5***  22.5*** 
Non-metro TAS  42.2***  41.0***  ACT  24.0***  23.3*** 
NT  31.0***  31.0***  House price growth  –0.1  –0.1 
Tenure selection term  2.4  2.4  Mortgage selection term 17.4
(c) 17.4 
Adjusted R
2  0.278    No of observations  2 327   
Notes:    ***, **, and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
    (a) Europe refers to Italy, Greece, Netherlands or Germany. 
    (b) Represents ordered categorical variables. 
    (c) Represents significance at 11 per cent level. 
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4.2.1  Stage of the household in the life cycle 
A household’s stage in the life cycle should be a key explanator of a household’s 
housing leverage. Taking the results in Table 1 at face value, one might expect 
housing leverage to rise as households purchase homes and acquire debt during 
their family formation years, and then fall as they repay this debt. Our results are, 
however, mainly suggestive of leverage falling monotonically as households move 
through the life cycle. A household head that is one year older is associated with 
up to 0.6 percentage points less leverage, while an age-squared term was negative 
but insignificant if included. This contrasts with the positive coefficient on age and 
negative coefficient on the square of age that would be required to obtain a hump-
shaped profile. 
A number of other variables are also suggestive of leverage falling as households 
move through the life cycle. For a given term for the mortgage, a move-in date that 
is one year earlier than an otherwise identical household implies that the 
household’s housing leverage will be about 1.8 percentage points lower, since both 
the move-in date and the expected payoff date are then one year earlier. This 
suggests an important role for passive paydown of mortgages on schedule; 
households that are older and have lived in their homes for longer have lower 
leverage in part simply because they have had longer to pay their mortgage off. In 
addition, rising housing prices imply that mortgages taken out earlier were likely to 
be smaller, and thus a smaller proportion of the home’s current estimated price. On 
the other hand, some households must be making explicit decisions about the end 
date of their mortgage; otherwise, move-in date and payoff date would not both be 
significant because they would then be more closely correlated. Indeed, the 
expected loan terms implied by the move-in and payoff dates are overwhelmingly 
shorter than the 20 to 25-year terms generally specified in loan contracts. These 
financial decisions are likely to be dependent on households’ assessments of their 
ability to achieve the targeted payoff date, and thus on their incomes and means 
more generally. Nonetheless, the significance of the coefficient on expected payoff 
date in a multivariate setting indicates that these expectations are also in large part 
independent of income and other factors, instead capturing household preferences 
about debt duration and portfolios that are not explained by income and 
demographic variables alone. 
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The combined size and precision of the estimated coefficients on these two 
variables suggest that this passive paydown effect is more important than any pure 
age effect. On the other hand, the significance of the coefficient on age after 
controlling for these factors indicates that age on its own also plays a role in 
determining leverage. This might be because older households have had longer to 
accumulate wealth (something that we cannot measure using the first wave of 
HILDA). Moreover, other significant explanators of leverage also suggest a more 
explicit life-cycle interpretation. Married household heads and those in de facto 
relationships tend to have slightly higher leverage than homeowners that have 
never married, although the difference is not significant at conventional levels. 
Households with retired household heads were both significantly less likely to have 
a mortgage, and to have lower leverage than other households when they did. 
4.2.2  The means of the household 
Our expectation that leverage should rise with household means is generally 
supported by the data. For example, our main indicator of household means, 
household income, is positively related to leverage, although it is only statistically 
significant at the 11 per cent level. The magnitude of the effect is small, with each 
extra $10  000 of income associated with, at most, only 0.7  percentage points 
higher leverage. Increased income appears to be more closely associated with 
higher values of both debt and housing assets than with the ratio of those two 
variables. We also find tentative evidence that the effect of household income on 
leverage is non-linear, with the negative sign on the income-squared variable 
implying that leverage is increasing in income but at a decreasing rate. The 
coefficient on this term is so small that leverage does not begin falling until income 
reaches about $500 000. 
Two measures of households’ subjective views about their incomes – the ease with 
which they are making ends meet (income adequacy), and their satisfaction with 
their pay – were included in the model to determine whether such measures of 
income relative to perceived requirements add information above that of measured 
income. Neither variable is closely correlated with reported actual income. 
Reported satisfaction with pay is statistically significant with a small positive 
coefficient, perhaps indicating that respondents that are highly satisfied with their 
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pay are less concerned about their vulnerability to future income shocks, and are 
thus more willing to take on higher gearing.7 
Past loan repayments in excess of the contracted minimum will naturally result in 
lower leverage at a given point in time, all else equal. Although the HILDA Survey 
does not explicitly ask about the extent of these past overpayments, respondents 
were asked if the loan repayments were (currently) ahead of schedule, behind 
schedule, or about on schedule. Households that reported that they were ahead of 
schedule in the repayments on the main loan against their home had leverage 
5.4 percentage points lower than that of otherwise similar households. 
The means of the household captures more than just its income. Factors such as 
family breakdown, permanency of employment, negative income shocks and 
familial support could also influence leverage by affecting households’ ability to 
take on and pay off debt. Our results suggest that such factors do add some 
information in explaining household housing leverage. For example, households 
with separated household heads have considerably higher leverage (11 percentage 
points) than other households. However, the fact that divorced household heads do 
not have higher leverage than other households suggests the impact of family 
breakdown on leverage may be only temporary; this possibility could be confirmed 
using the longitudinal aspects of the HILDA Survey to track households through 
the process of breakdown. 
One indicator of household means, although not a causal factor, is that the results 
show that households whose homes are in poor condition have higher leverage 
than other households. This may be an example of reverse causation; households 
with high leverage may be too financially stretched to pay for renovations, and 
might be unable to borrow more to do so. 
4.2.3  Household characteristics and attitudes 
Besides the structural characteristics of households such as age and income, we 
also expect household attitudes to housing and debt to influence their housing 
leverage. For example, we may have expected that households that are more 
                                           
7  The point estimates of other parameters are not sensitive to the inclusion of these subjective 
means variables, indicating that their possible endogeneity is not a major concern. 
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comfortable about taking on debt would have higher leverage than other 
households. However, a variable that summarised households’ attitude to 
borrowing for items such as holidays, cars, and clothes, did not enter significantly 
into the model, although the point estimate did have the expected sign. Similarly, 
risk-averse households might be expected to prefer to pay housing debt off more 
rapidly and thus have lower leverage. However, our results indicated that 
households indicating a high aversion to risk in their saving decisions did not have 
significantly lower leverage on their homes, although the coefficient on this 
variable is again of the expected sign. This may suggest that these households’ 
aversion to the riskiness of debt might be offset by a preference for housing assets 
over other assets they perceive as riskier; confirming this suspicion will not be 
possible until Wave 2 data on other kinds of assets and debt are available. 
Other attitudinal variables do, however, enter the regression significantly. For 
example, households that pay their credit card off on time each month have lower 
leverage than households that do not. This could reflect either such households’ 
preference for paying as little interest as possible on their debt, or perhaps greater 
financial sophistication and means. Households with long savings horizons have 
slightly higher leverage than households with shorter savings horizons. 
The results also show that several other indicators of households’ financial 
situation have significant associations with leverage outcomes. Although some of 
these indicators are symptomatic of the same causes as are influencing leverage, 
rather than themselves being causal factors, they provide some descriptive value in 
determining what kinds of households are most leveraged. For example, 
households who have owned more than one home – as opposed to first-home 
buyers – have slightly higher than average leverage, which suggests that 
households take on more debt when trading up, relative to the asset’s value. 
Households that report some rental income, and therefore must own investment 
property, also have substantially higher leverage (14 percentage points) than other 
households. This result probably identifies a sub-group of the population that has 
actively engaged in leveraged asset accumulation, and is therefore willingly taking 
on the increased financial risks that this entails. 
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We also observe that households that took out loans from financial institutions at 
the time of purchase have higher leverage than the small proportion that did not.8 
Households that did not require a loan from a bank or other financial intermediary 
presumably acquired the property through inheritance, or used their own resources 
and bequests, gifts or loans from friends and family to fund their purchase. Loans 
from friends and family are included in the measure of leverage used here, but the 
other means of funding the purchase are clearly substitutes for debt that would 
reduce initial leverage at the time of purchase. Although some of these households 
might subsequently take out a loan secured against their home, in general they are 
likely to have little debt against their home. 
People’s cultural background may affect their leverage by influencing attitudes to 
debt, homeownership and intergenerational transfers; variations in homeownership 
rates amongst households of different ethnic origins have previously been observed 
in Australian data (Bourassa 1994, 1995). To test whether these differences reflect 
the migration experience or transmitted cultural values, we included variables 
representing the country of birth of both the household heads and their parents. 
Migrants will report both their own and their parents’ birthplaces as being outside 
Australia, while second-generation Australians will report parental birthplaces 
outside Australia and their own birthplace as Australia. 
We found that only the parental background variables were significant. Households 
with heads whose fathers were born in continental Europe had leverage 
7 percentage points lower than households where the head’s father was born in 
Australia. In contrast, households with heads whose fathers were born in the UK 
had higher leverage than other households.9 Taken at face value, these results 
could be interpreted as indicating that a combination of cultural values and 
intergenerational transfers explains the pattern of lower than average leverage for 
the children of European migrants, rather than being a product of the migration 
experience. 
                                           
8  Only 4 per cent of households who report having a mortgage did not take out an institutional 
loan at the time of purchase. However, over all owners, this increases to 28 per cent. 
9  Using birthplace of mother or of either parent gave virtually identical results. The number of 
households where the heads or their parents were born in other regions was too small to 
produce statistically significant estimates. Variables representing birth in other regions were 
therefore excluded from our preferred specification. 
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4.2.4 Geographic  variables 
We also include a series of regional dummies to potentially capture two effects. 
First, they may capture different preferences for leverage across different regions, 
or differences in lending policies of banks. Second, they may proxy for different 
rates of housing price growth across regions, which can be expected to have 
exogenously influenced households’ housing leverage. Although disaggregated 
data on growth in median house prices over the past two years resulted in the 
expected significant negative coefficient on its own, this was dominated by the 
inclusion of a suite of location dummies distinguishing the inner suburbs of the 
capital city, the outer suburbs of the capital city, and the non-metropolitan regions 
of each state.10 Households move at different times and have thus experienced 
different degrees of inflation of the value of their home since they purchased it. 
Available data on Australian housing prices do not permit construction of regional 
level data on housing price growth over each individual household’s holding 
period for their home, so housing price growth had to be calculated over a fixed 
window. The dummies may therefore be capturing variations in averages for both 
price growth and holding period, as well as other regional influences on leverage. 
Using inner Melbourne as our base category because it is the region that has 
experienced the most rapid price growth in recent years, we can see that all other 
regions have higher leverage than inner Melbourne, and that the differences are 
broadly consistent with the recent pattern of relative growth rates for housing 
prices. In general, leverage is higher in non-metropolitan regions than metropolitan 
regions, and leverage is highest in Tasmania and Queensland. Brisbane’s high 
average leverage is a puzzle, given that its price growth has been rapid in recent 
years, but this may be partly a base effect. 
4.2.5  Effect of selection bias 
The model with selection effects shown in Table  4 provides only a marginal 
improvement in fit over a model estimated over only those households that have 
leverage (adjusted R
2 of 0.278 versus 0.274). The coefficient on the tenure 
                                           
10 The housing price data used were a combination of regional-level median housing prices from 
Residex for the eastern seaboard states, and metropolitan and non-metropolitan dwelling 
prices compiled by the Commonwealth Bank for the HIA Housing Report for the other states. 
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selection term is not significant, while the coefficient on the mortgage selection 
term is significant only at the 11  per cent level and not at more conventional 
thresholds. Given the non-overlapping sets of explanators in the selection 
equations, it seems unlikely that identification problems drive this result, although 
multicollinearity could be an issue instead. It is more likely that the opposite 
effects that key variables, such as age and time the household has lived at the 
address, have on mortgage and tenure selection partially net out in the leverage 
equation. Since the selection terms combine information from both selection 
equations, these important variables may generate little net selection bias. Together 
with the bias arising from other variables in the model, this seems to result in only 
a minor degree of selection bias even though this is clearly a model with self-
selection. The difference between the bias-corrected marginal effects and total 
effects are consistent with the mortgage equation dominating the tenure equation 
when variables counteract each other. 
Despite the insignificance of the selection terms, the effects of the adjustment on 
coefficients for several key behavioural variables relating to life cycle and tenure 
characteristics are nonetheless large enough to conclude that this exercise enhances 
our understanding of population behaviour compared with the results implied by 
the non-bias adjusted model. Table  5 presents selected coefficients from the 
unadjusted model alongside the comparable marginal effects derived from the 
model results shown in Table 4. This enables a comparison with the model with 
selection effects and thus demonstrates where there are important differences. 
The unadjusted model suggests a much smaller effect of age and time at address in 
diminishing the remaining loan size, and thus leverage, than the marginal effect 
implied by the model adjusted for selection bias. This unadjusted model also 
substantially understates the base effect of whether the household originally took 
out an institutional loan to help fund the purchase. Although neither specification 
generates an income effect that is significant at conventional levels, the point 
estimates are sufficiently different that economic interpretation might be affected. 
In addition, our results suggest that this double-selection model is superior to a 
standard single-selection model with a Heckman correction. An alternative 
specification with only one selection equation, distinguishing mortgage-holders 
from other households and treating renters and homeowners without mortgages the 
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same, produces different results that appear to fit the data less well than our 
preferred specification (these results are available from the authors). Although the 
measure of selection bias is not quite statistically significant, the results presented 
in this paper clearly show that such adjustments are useful when examining 
leverage across the whole household sector. 
Table 5: Marginal Effects With and Without Selection Bias Correction 
  With correction  Without correction  % difference 
Household income  0.04  0.03  35.3 
Age –0.48  –0.36***  25.2 
Has rental income  14.20***  14.10***  0.5 
Satisfaction with pay  0.76***  0.75***  1.5 
Took out institutional loan to buy home  12.60  –1.30***  108.1 
Retired –10.50  –4.50  57.0 
Income adequacy  –0.70  –0.10  85.3 
Married 3.16  2.30  27.1 
Separated 11.00***  10.20***  7.1 
Time lived at address  –0.75**  –0.44***  41.8 
Father born in Europe  –6.88***  –6.90**  –0.34 
Moves in last 10 years  0.84  0.99**  –19.13 
Note:  ***, **, and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The results presented here are descriptive, rather than being a fully causal model of 
household behaviour. Households’ leverage at any point in time reflects the 
cumulation of many past decisions including the decision to purchase, to pay off 
the original mortgage or to make overpayments when it is feasible to do so. Cross-
sectional data can be used to relate current leverage to observable characteristics, 
but it is not feasible to reconstruct all these past decisions. 
The results suggest several descriptive conclusions about the pattern of housing 
leverage in Australia. The graphical results indicate that the households that are 
most highly leveraged are those most able to bear the debt – mid-life households 
with high income. Leverage is also higher for households living in areas least 
vulnerable to reversals in housing prices, the outer suburbs and non-metropolitan 
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regions that have experienced relatively smaller price gains in recent years. Young 
homeowners are likely to have particularly high leverage, but young households in 
general are less likely to be homeowners. On the other hand, households that are 
negatively geared on investment property, and thus declaring a loss on their rental 
income, are much more likely to have a mortgage, and to have higher leverage 
when they do have a mortgage. This finding is indicative of a sub-group of the 
population that is willingly engaging in leveraged asset accumulation, and taking 
the associated financial risks. The general picture, however, accords with aggregate 
data in suggesting that leverage on the housing stock remains fairly moderate. 
The econometric modelling also shows significant roles for age, life-cycle stage 
and time at address variables. This points to the importance of the passive 
paydown of debt as scheduled in the household’s mortgage contract, in 
determining current leverage. Similarly, the pattern of coefficients on the 
locational variables suggests that increases in housing prices reduce leverage, and 
are not offset by households increasing their debt in response to the increase in 
wealth. These determinants of leverage can all be characterised as largely being 
beyond the control of individual households, suggesting that at least in the short 
run, households do not necessarily adjust their balance sheet to maintain a desired 
leverage ratio as predicted by some theoretical models. Against this, however, we 
find evidence of at least some households making explicit decisions about the end 
date of their mortgage, which might not be the date specified in the loan contract. 
As noted earlier, if some households did not make conscious decisions about the 
desired date on which their loan will be fully paid off, move-in date and payoff 
date would not both be significant in our estimated leverage equation. 
Amongst the households making these explicit decisions about their payoff date, at 
least, we might expect deliberate portfolio reactions to developments in interest 
rates and housing prices, rather than simply adhering to a predetermined path for 
their remaining outstanding debt. Observing such reactions would, however, 
require tracking households through time. The longitudinal nature of the HILDA 
Survey will make it uniquely suited, amongst all datasets for Australia, to 
examination of these household responses. Future waves of the HILDA dataset 
will therefore be essential for further work on understanding households’ decisions 
about their balance sheets, leverage and debt, and in particular their responses to 
interest rate changes and housing price movements through these channels. 
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Appendix A: Income Imputation and Results 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the nature of the missing data leaves us with the need 
to impute income for three separate types of missing cases. For Type I individuals 
we impute total gross financial year income. For Type II individuals we impute 
gross financial year wage and salary income and add this imputed income to their 
reported gross financial year non-wage and salary income. For Type III individuals 
we impute gross financial year non-wage and salary income and add this imputed 
income to their reported gross financial year wage and salary income. Table A1 
contains all the relevant results. 
In all cases, missing values are imputed using the predictive mean matching 
(PMM) method outlined in Little (1988). In the first stage this involves estimating 
a regression on the variable to be imputed for individuals without missing values – 
in our case income. Next the model with the highest R
2 is used to predict the 
income of individuals with missing values. For every missing value we find the 
record with the nearest predicted value. The actual value of this ‘donor’ is then 
imputed for the missing value. The advantages of using the PMM method over 
other single imputation methods, such as simply imputing the conditional mean 
obtained from a regression, are that it ensures that only feasible values of the 
variable are imputed, and that a random error component is introduced so that 
imputed values have a similar variance to the reported values (ISER 2002). 
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Table A1: Income Imputation Results 
I Total income (’000)    II Wage income (’000)  III Non-wage income (’000) 
Age 1.6***    Age 0.8***  Age  0.08*** 
Age squared  –0.15***   Age squared  –0.01***     
VIC –0.3    VIC –1.2**  VIC 0.6 
QLD –1.4*    QLD  0.0  QLD 0.0 
SA –2.4**    SA –1.2*  SA  –0.8 
WA –0.9    WA –2.4***  WA 1.3** 
ACT 6.3***    ACT 4.8***  ACT  –1.5 
Make ends meet  3.9***   Make ends meet  2.1***  Make ends meet  0.9*** 
Socio-economic 1.0***    Socio-economic 0.1***  Socio-economic  
Has disability  2.3***    Business income  –16.0***  Business income  20.9*** 
Lone person  7.9***   Govt benefit  –5.1***  Govt benefit  2.6*** 
Group household  6.7***    Receives interest  1.2***  Receives interest  4.1*** 
Sole parent, 
dependant children 
6.8***    Receives rent  4.4***  Receives rent  4.5*** 
     Receives dividends  2.5***  Receives dividends  1.0** 
Sole parent, no 
dependant children 
4.4**   Non-metropolitan –1.9***  Age  pensioner  –2.3*** 
     Inner-city  1.5***  Receives  royalties  3.9 
Persons in h’hold  –1.4***   Union member  5.9***  Union member  –1.9*** 
Employed 13.0***    Employed 11.6***  Employed  –4.2*** 
Retired –7.6***    Retired  –10.6***  Retired 4.3*** 
Home duties  –6.0***    Spouse’s income  0.0***  Spouse’s income  0.1*** 
Multifamily home  –3.7*   Multifamily home  –3.6**  Student  –1.7 
     Household head  9.9***  Household head  6.2*** 
No of bedrooms  0.8***   Has disability  1.5***  Health  0.2 
Home’s condition  –1.1***   Home’s condition  –0.6***  Home’s condition  –0.3 
Home value  0.03***   Home value  0.004*** Home value  0.004***
No of children  1.4***       No of children  0.3* 
Married  8.1***    Education level 2  –10.9***  Never married  3.9*** 
Separated  4.7***    Education level 3  –11.1***  Separated  3.9*** 
De facto  10.0***    Education level 4  –11.6***  De facto  2.3*** 
Divorced  4.9***    Education level 5  –10.7***  Divorced  4.8*** 
Widowed 8.5***    Widowed 4.4*  Widowed  1.8* 
Adjusted R
2 0.32    Adjusted  R
2 0.46  Adjusted  R
2 0.204 
RMSE  $26 000   RMSE  $19 000  RMSE  $20 500 
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